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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Grace Anne Burrington appeals from the judgment of conviction and commitment entered

upon her

guilty plea t0 burglary.

Burrington contends the

district court

abused

its

discretion

by

denying her motion to terminate the n0 contact order, by imposing an excessive sentence, and by
denying her Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

Burrington shot her boyfriend as he
his left arm.

(PSI, p.45.)

slept.

(PSI, pp.3-4.

1)

The

bullet struck the Victim in

In the ensuing chaos, Burrington ran outside yelling for help, and the

Victim wrapped a pair 0f pants around his bleeding arm and applied pressure t0 the wound. (PSI,

1,

and Ada County Sheriff’s

(PSI, p.98.)

However, she told three

pp.45, 342.) Eventually, the Victim convinced Burrington to call 91
deputies responded. (PSI, pp.3, 97-98.)

Burrington admitted that she shot her boyfriend.
different versions about

how the shooting unfolded.

(E PSI, pp.95-98.)

ofﬁcers that she was cleaning the bedroom closet and

She then told deputies
trigger” not

that she

“somehow

and the Victim “were looking

knowing the gun was loaded.

(PSI, p.95.)

She ﬁrst told responding

a gunshot rang out.” (PSI, p.95.)

at the

gun” and

Finally, she told deputies that she

concerned about her children’s safety because the gun was not stored in a gun

gun out of its holster

to transition

it

into a

more secure

got distracted before putting the gun into the

1

For purposes 0f uniformity, the

brief, p.1, ns.1-2.)

state

holster.

more secure

that “she pulled the

(PSI, p.97.)

holster

safe, so

was

she took the

She claimed

that she

and forgot what she was doing.

adopts the Appellant’s citation designations. (Appellant’s

According to

(PSI, p.97.)

[them] over” or

As

her, the

gun ﬁred when she picked up a

“move them around.”

(PSI, pp.96-97, 126, 128.)

a result of the gunshot, the Victim sustained a broken

He

(R., p.21 1.)

The

arm and permanent nerve damage.

also lost his career in construction because his injuries prevent

more than two pounds.
employment.

pair of jeans t0 either “ﬂip

(R., p.21 1.)

The

have also affected his

injuries

him from

ability t0

lifting

ﬁnd new

(R., p.21 1.)

state

charged Burrington with aggravated battery and an enhancement use 0f a ﬁrearm

during the commission of a crime. (R., pp.58-59.) The state’s plea offer, however, only required

Burrington to plead guilty t0 a single amended charge of burglary. (R., pp.1 12-13, 117-18.)
part of the proffered agreement, the state also agreed t0 limit

its

As

sentencing recommendation t0

probation With an underlying sentence 0f ten years, with three years ﬁxed. (R., pp.99, 112.)

Pursuant t0 the plea agreement, Burrington pled guilty to burglary.
V01.

I,

failing

p.14, L.21

t0

—

pp.99-1

(R.,

timely cooperate With the presentence

its

ﬂ

R., p.1 13.)

obligation t0

investigation

sentencing the state

I,

particular sentence.

recommended

recommend probation.
V01.

Because ofher breach, the court concluded

recommend a

Tr.

However, she breached the plea agreement before sentencing by

p.17, L.7.)

process,

including timely

cooperation With any evaluator the court orders after plea and prior to sentencing. (Tr. V01.
Ls.13-23;

1 1;

(Tr. Vol.

I,

(Tr. V01.

I,

that the state

was

p.30, Ls.21-25.)

The

state also

p.30,

relieved 0f

Thus, during

a ten-year sentence, With four years ﬁxed, but

p.32, Ls.2-9.)

I,

it

did not

requested a n0 contact order. (Tr.

p.34, Ls.7-10.) Burrington argued for probation With an underlying sentence 0f ten years,

With two years ﬁxed. (Tr. Vol.
retain jurisdiction. (Tr.

Vol

I,

I,

p.44, Ls.4-7.) Alternatively, Burrington requested that the court

p.50, Ls.13-19.)

The
(R.,

did

district court

pp.136-38;

it

Tr.,

V01.

sentenced Burrington t0 a uniﬁed term of ten years, with two years ﬁxed.

I,

(R., pp.136-38.)

retain jurisdiction.

immediately.

p.63, Ls.18-21.)

(Tr. Vol.

I,

The court did not place Burrington 0n probation nor

Instead, the court ordered the sentence t0

p.64, Ls.1-2.)

The court

also issued a

be executed

n0 contact order with no

exceptions, Which prohibited Burrington from having any contact With the Victim for ten years.
(Sealed, pp.8-9; Tr.

V01

I,

p.64, L.13

— p.65,

L.3.) Burrington timely

ﬁled a notice of appeal from

the judgment. (R., pp.140-43, 169-71.)

Less than three months
(R., p.182; Tr. V01.

the

no contact

motion

II,

p.9, Ls.7-18.)

(Tr. V01.

order.

later,

II,

n0 contact

t0 terminate the

Burrington

Both the

p.9,

L.24 —

moved

state

t0

and the Victim objected

The

p. 10, L.1 1.)

order. (Tr. V01.

have the n0 contact order terminated.

II,

p.1

1,

district court

Ls.6-1

to the termination

denied Burrington’s

1.)

Burrington also ﬁled a motion for reduction of her sentence pursuant to Rule 35.
pp.173-79, 191-201.)

letters

of

(R.,

In support of her motion, she submitted a handwritten letter, three brief

from her case manager, a certiﬁcate 0f completion from the Soundstart program, a certiﬁcate

of completion from a faith-based addiction recovery program, a
sober living

201 .) The

facility,

letter

0f acceptance t0 Rising Sun

and a conduct report from the Department of Correction.

district court

denied the Rule 35 motion Without a hearing.

(R., pp.

1

77-79, 192-

(R., pp.209-14.)

ISSUES
Burrington states the issues 0n appeal

I.

II.

Did

the district court abuse

motion

t0 terminate the

Did the

district court

0f ten years,
III.

Did the

as:

its

discretion

by denying Ms. Burrington’s

n0 contact order?

by imposing an excessive sentence
With two years ﬁxed, 0n Ms. Burrington for burglary?

district court

abuse

its

discretion

abuse

its

discretion

by denying Ms. Burrington’s Rule

35 motion?
(Appellant’s brief, p.3)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Burrington

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

denied

her motion t0 terminate the no contact order?

II.

Has Burrington

failed t0

III.

Has Burrington

failed to

her Rule 35 motion?

show
show

that the district court

abused

that the district court

its

abused

sentencing discretion?

its

discretion

When

it

denied

ARGUMENT
I.

Burrington Has Failed

A.

To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When
Her Motion To Terminate The No Contact Order

It

Denied

Introduction

On appeal, Burrington asserts that the district court abused its discretion When it denied her
motion

to terminate the

n0 contact

the district court failed to reach

contact order

facilitated

the

its

(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.) According t0 Burrington,

order.

decision

would have allowed her
development 0f new

t0

by

the exercise of reason because terminating the

work While

skills,

in custody,

assisted her rehabilitation,

demonstrate an ability to succeed under community supervision.

argument

motion

is

unavailing.

The

district court

to terminate the ten—year

Which

did not abuse

its

in turn

would have

and allowed her

(Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

discretion

no contact order just three months

n0

to

Her

When it denied Burrington’s

after

it

was imposed because

the Victim obj ected t0 terminating the order and the underlying facts of the case supported the

n0

contact order remaining in effect.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The decision Whether
district court.” State V.

to

modify a no contact order

is

Within the sound discretion of the

Cobler, 148 Idaho 769, 771, 229 P.3d 374, 376 (2010).

When reviewing

a lower court’s decision for an abuse 0f discretion, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion;
(2) acted within the

boundaries 0f

its

discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards

applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

reason.

State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018)

by

the exercise of

(citation omitted).

On

appeal, the appellant bears the burden of showing an abuse 0f discretion. State V. Enno, 119 Idaho

392, 409, 807 P.2d 610, 627 (1991).

Burrington Has Failed

C.

Its

Discretion

The

district court

contact order.

that a

When It

LC.

did not abuse

When a person is

no contact order

issued.

T0 Carry Her Burden Of Showing That The District Court Abused
Denied Her Motion T0 Terminate The No Contact Order

is

§ 18-920(1).

its

discretion

When it denied the motion to

charged With 0r convicted of any “offense for Which a court ﬁnds

appropriate,” an order forbidding contact with another person

Idaho Criminal Rule 46.2

920’s grant of authority and “sets forth the

minimum

modiﬁcation and termination 0f n0 contact orders

(“Whenever a n0 contact order
district court’s discretionary

is

is

may be

a procedural rule that implements § 18-

requirements for a valid n0 contact order.”

339 P.3d 1126, 1129 (2014). Rule 46.2 contemplates the

State V. Herren, 157 Idaho 722, 725,

is

terminate the n0

issued,

modiﬁed

E

at the court’s discretion.

0r terminated

by

the court

.

.

.

I.C.R. 46.2

.”).

Here, the

decision to deny Burrington’s motion to terminate the no contact order

supported by the Victim’s objection to the motion and the severity of the underlying facts in this

case.

The Victim’s objection
the court’s decision to

to termination

deny Burrington’s motion

court determined that a n0 contact order

was

of the no contact order weighed heavily in favor 0f
to terminate the

was appropriate

n0 contact

in this case

and

ten years from the date of its issuance. (Sealed, pp.8-9.) Thus, at

order

was intended

t0

which she ﬁled

The

district

set a termination date that

its

inception the no contact

remain in place for the duration of Burrington’s sentence, including any

period 0f incarceration or parole.

order,

order.

just three

The Victim objected

months

any contact With [Burrington].” (PSI,

to Burrington’s

into her sentence, as

p.4; Tr. V01.

II,

motion

to terminate the

he justiﬁably desired not “to have

p.10, Ls.10-1

1.)

After being shot by his

live-in girlfriend (and the

mother of his two

children), the Victim discovered that Burrington

may have

money from

been unfaithﬁll, and he suspected

that she

tampered with his medication

he was released from the hospital. (PSI,

after

taken

had

bank account and

his

p.4.)

Additionally, the underlying facts of the case justify the court’s decision not t0 terminate

the

no contact

order.

Unprovoked, Burrington shot the Victim—her then-boyfriend and father of

her two children—as he slept in their bed. (PSI, p.3.) Her two children were asleep in the house
at the

time 0f the shooting. (PSI, p.3.)

It

took the Victim several attempts t0 get Burrington t0

call

911 for help. (PSI, p.45.) Burrington misrepresented to law enforcement what had happened by
telling multiple versions

of how she had shot the Victim.

(m PSI, pp.95-98.2)

As

a result of his

gunshot wounds, the Victim suffered a broken arm and permanent nerve damage that prevents him

from

lifting

employment.

more than two pounds, which
(R., p.21 1.)

obj ection to the

motion

in turn has affected his ability t0

Given the severity 0f the underlying

facts

gainful

0f this case and the Victim’s

to terminate, the district court’s reasonable decision t0

terminate the no contact order

ﬁnd

deny the motion

to

was not an abuse 0f discretion.

On appeal, Burrington has failed t0 carry her burden of demonstrating that the district court
abused

its

order.

First,

discretion.

Below, Burrington asserted two grounds for termination of the no contact

she argued that the n0 contact order prevented her from discussing child custody

issues With the Victim.

(Tr. V01.

II,

p.9, Ls.3-18.)

2

Second, she argued that the no contact order

The district court found it signiﬁcant that the gun has a double-action With a double-trigger safety.
Due t0 the nature of the gun’s safety mechanism, Burrington must have had her ﬁnger
0n both parts of the trigger in order to ﬁre the gun. (R., p.21 1.) Furthermore, a gunsmith from the
manufacturer inspected the gun and determined that it was functioning properly. (Tr. V01. I, p.35,
Ls. 12-22.) The gunsmith opined that the gun used in this case could not have been ﬁred Without
the trigger being pulled in accordance with how the gun was designed to operate. (Tr. Vol. I, p.35,
Ls.23-25.) The court’s ﬁnding and the gunsmith’s opinion directly contradict Burrington’s story
(R., p.21 1.)

that

“somehow

a gunshot rang out.” (PSI, p.3.)

prevented her from obtaining approval for work off compound.
p.182.)

On

(Tr. Vol.

II,

p.9, Ls.12-18; R.,

appeal, Burrington incorrectly argues that the district court failed t0 exercise reason

because terminating the order would have allowed her t0 work While in custody, Which in turn

would have

facilitated the

t0 demonstrate

district court

an

ability t0

skills, assisted

her rehabilitation, and allowed her

succeed under community supervision. (Appellant’s

brief, p.5.)

The

properly considered and rejected both grounds for termination.

With respect
not be

development 0f new

modiﬁed

t0

t0 the ﬁrst ground, the district court

accommodate discussions between Burrington and

The

child custody issues.

(Tr. V01.

the protected party about

court explained that the n0 contact order already permits her to “attend

court proceedings involving

custody case.”

concluded that the no contact order need

II,

.

.

.

the protected person,” including “court hearings in any child

— p.1 1,

p.10, L.21

L.5;

ﬂ

Sealed, p.8.) Thus, Burrington can address

any child custody issues With the protected party in the courtroom Without Violating the no contact
order.

this

Accordingly, the court determined that

ground. (Tr. V01.

With respect

II,

p.10, Ls.12-17; p.1

t0 the

1,

it

was “not necessary

center.”

that Burrington’s inability to get

order.” (Tr. V01.

L.1

1.)

II,

.

to

modify the order” on

Ls.2-5.)

The court

(Tr. V01.

who have n0

1,

Ls.6-10.)

work off compound

is

“not a reason for

did not warrant

Department 0f

contact orders simply

The court

p.1

II,

it

correctly explained that the

Correction “runs their programs” and can “decide that people

work

.

second ground, the court likewise concluded that

termination of the no contact order.

aren’t eligible for the

.

me

correctly concluded

to

p.1 1, Ls.10-1 1.) Ultimately, the court denied the motion.

lift

the

no contact

(Tr. V01.

II,

p.1

1,

In sum, the district court considered and properly rejected both of the grounds for

termination that Burrington asserted.

Given
changed

that Burrington has failed to establish

that the

n0 contact order

court did not reach

its

is

any circumstances

no longer appropriate, she has

decision t0 deny her motion

by

that

failed to

have so substantially

show

the exercise 0f reason.

that the district

Consequently, she

has failed t0 show an abuse 0f discretion.

II.

Burrington Has Failed

A.

T0 Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

Next, Burrington argues that the

district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

imposed a

sentence 0f ten years, With two years ﬁxed, rather than retaining jurisdiction or suspending the
sentence in favor ofprobation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) According t0 Burrington, her sentence

is

excessive in light 0f mitigating factors such as her substance abuse issues, amenability t0

treatment, acceptance ofresponsibility, and remorse. (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

the district court’s sentence of ten years, with

B.

Standard

The record supports

two years ﬁxed.

Of Review

The length 0f a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

Where an

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

appellant contends that the sentencing court imposed an

excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court conducts an independent review 0f the record,

having regard for the nature 0f the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 0f the
public interest. State V. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982).

C.

Burrington Has

The

Shown N0 Abuse Of The

district court

did not abuse

its

District Court’s Sentencing Discretion

sentencing discretion

executed a uniﬁed sentence 0f ten years, With two years ﬁxed.

When it imposed and immediately

It is

presumed that the ﬁxed portion

0f the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of conﬁnement. Oliver, 144 Idaho
170 P.3d
is

at

391 (citing State

V.

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that
State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

discretion.

carry this burden the appellant must

show

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016)

the sentence

is

Where

it is

at

726,

a sentence

a clear abuse of

(citations omitted).

To

excessive under any reasonable View of

the facts. Li.

A

sentence

is

reasonable if

it

appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective 0f

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

retribution.

Li The

differing weights

district court

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

when deciding upon the

sentence. Li. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State V. Moore, 131

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

district court

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the objectives 0f punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference to the

trial

judge, this Court will not substitute

a reasonable sentence Where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting State

V.

Stevens,

its

8,

View of

368 P.3d

146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).

Furthermore, “[a] sentence ﬁxed within the limits prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be
considered an abuse of discretion by the

trial

court.” Li. (quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90,

645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
Burrington concedes that her “sentence does not exceed the statutory
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Thus, as she acknowledges, in order to

10

show

maximum.”

“the sentence imposed

was

unreasonable, [she] must

show

that the sentence, in light

under any reasonable View of the

She cannot do

omitted).)

facts.”

0f the governing

criteria, is

excessive

(Appellant’s brief, p.6 (internal quotation and citation

so.

In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court reviewed and considered the

materials in the presentence investigation report, (Tr. V01.

I,

p.22, L. 12

— p.23,

L.6.) In accordance

With I.C.R. 32(b), the presentence investigation report included a description of the underlying
criminal activity, including Burrington’s explanations for the act, and the Victim’s version of

Burrington’s

events;

prior

criminal

information

history;

employment, ﬁnancial, medical, and marital background; a
review. (Tr. Vol.

I,

p.22, Ls.12-22;

as well as Burrington’s character

The court

also considered

p.54, Ls.7-13; p.58, L.14

—

p.59,

ﬂ

about

her

educational,

social,

GAIN evaluation;

and, a mental health

PSI.) Thus, the court considered the nature 0f the offense

and criminal history

in fashioning

an appropriate sentence.

and weighed each 0f the necessary TLhilP

factors.

(Tr. V01.

L24.) Indeed, the court even required the prosecutor

I,

t0 tie her

recitation ofthe underlying facts t0 the relevant Toohill factors during the sentencing hearing. (Tr.

V01.

I,

p.40, L.19

— p.41,

L.9.)

The court considered the necessity of a term of imprisonment
(Tr. V01.

I,

p.42, Ls.12-24; p.59, Ls.18—24.)

The court

for

“community protection.”

also considered the

need for general and

speciﬁc deterrence and told Burrington that the court suspected “incarceration

you from making

this

kind of decision again.”

(Tr. Vol.

I,

is

going t0 deter

p.58, Ls.20-21; p.59, Ls.9-17.)

considering Burrington’s need for rehabilitation, the court concluded that “rehabilitation

is

.

low priority” because despite Burrington’s drug problem, Which rehabilitation would be useful
the crime

3

was not motivated by

drugs. (Tr. V01.

I,

p.58, L.21

— p.59,

.

.

a

for,

L.8.) Finally, in considering

Toohill V. State, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
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In

the retribution, the court concluded that Burrington

had committed a “felonious act”

“deserving of some retribution in society’s View.” (Tr. V01.
In addition to considering the

criteria set forth in

for probation.

Whether

LC.

19-2521

§

(Tr. V01.

I,

TLhill

—

was

p.58, Ls.18—19.)

factors, the district court also properly

analyzed the

when it determined Burrington was not an appropriate

p.59, L.25

t0 place Burrington

I,

that

p.62, L.12 (quoting I.C. § 19-2521).)

candidate

In determining

0n probation, the court considered Burrington’s “unwillingness

t0

cooperate and follow the court’s orders,” her “longstanding substance-abuse problem,” her
criminal history,

investigator.”

criteria, the

and the

(Tr. V01.

fact

that

p.60, L.3

I,

court concluded

it

—

was

she

was

“abjectly untruthful

p.62, L.10.)

.

.

.

With the presentence

Applying these characteristics

“likely that [Burrington]

would” commit another crime by

“possess[ing] heroin again in the future while 0n a suspended sentence.” (Tr. V01.

24.)

most

The court also determined that she was
effectively

by

commitment

[her]

also determined imprisonment

10.) In light

is

I,

an institution.”

(Tr. V01.

p.62, Ls.4-6.)

its

for probation. (Tr. V01.

I,

p.61, Ls.18—

I,

p.61, Ls.21-24.)

The court

deterrent” t0 both

Finally, the court concluded that her criminal

a “multiple offender 0r professional criminal.” (Tr. Vol.

of the fact that the court properly analyzed the

court correctly reached

I,

“in need 0f correctional treatment that can be provided

would “provide appropriate punishment and

Burrington and others. (Tr. V01.
history revealed that she

t0

to the relevant

criteria set forth in I.C. §

ultimate conclusion that Burrington

I,

p.62, Ls.7-

19-2521, the

was not an appropriate candidate

p.62, Ls.1 1-12.)

Finally, the court considered

and rejected Burrington’s request for retained

jurisdiction,

concluding that the Department 0f Correction would accurately determine which rehabilitation

programs

to offer her

while in their custody. (Tr. Vol.

12

I,

p.62, L. 12

— p.63,

L.6.)

In sum, the district court properly relied

report, analyzed

each TLhill

factor,

on the materials

weighed the proper

Burrington’s request for retained jurisdiction.

criteria

in the presentence investigation

under

§ 19-2521,

and considered

Because the court exercised such reason

fashioning an appropriate sentence in this case, the court did not abuse

its

sentencing discretion

in

by

imposing and immediately executing a uniﬁed sentence of ten years, With two years ﬁxed.
Burrington erroneously asserts the

district court

imposed an excessive sentence because

it

did not adequately consider mitigating factors such as her “recent substance abuse issues, renewed

commitment

t0 sobriety, amenability

towards treatment, and acceptance of responsibility and

remorse.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.8—9.) The record belies this assertion.

The record reveals

that the court adequately considered mitigating factors

such as

Burrington’s substance abuse issues, her commitment t0 sobriety, and her amenability t0 treatment
in fashioning her sentence.

and need for treatment.
p.61, Ls.17-24.)

The court adequately considered Burrington’s substance abuse

(Tr. Vol.

I,

p.50, L.20

The court made an

— p.51,

L.7; p.58, L.23

explicit factual

— p.59,

issues

L.3; p.60, Ls.10-16;

ﬁnding during the sentencing hearing

that

Burrington could be treated most effectively by her commitment to an institution because she had
not been willing t0 get treatment in the community. (Tr. Vol.

The record

also

shows

acceptance 0f responsibility.

1.,

p.61, L.17

— p.62, L3.)

that the court adequately considered Burrington’s

When

asked by the court

if there

was anything she’d

remorse and
like to say to

the court during the sentencing hearing, Burrington expressed remorse t0 the Victim, the

community, the

court,

and everyone affected by her

actions.

(Tr. V01.

1.,

p.52, L.8

—

p.53, L.5.)

Burrington also stated that she took “full accountability for everything that [she had] done.” (Tr.
V01.

I.

p.53, Ls.23-24.)

Given

that the court adequately considered mitigating factors such as

13

Burrington’s substance abuse issues, her commitment t0 sobriety, and her amenability to treatment
in fashioning her sentence, she has failed to

show an abuse of discretion.

III.

Burrington Has Failed

A.

To Show That The

District Court Abused
Her Rule 35 Motion

Its

Discretion

When It Denied

Introduction

Finally, Burrington asserts that the “district court did not exercise reason

its

discretion

by denying her Rule 35 motion.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1 1.) According t0 Burrington,

she submitted

new and

additional information that “supported a sentence reduction, including a

period 0f retained jurisdiction or probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1
unavailing.

The

Standard

B.

district court

exercised sound reason

is

a plea for leniency, and

V. Grant,

(Ct.

it

Burrington’s argument

is

denied her plea for leniency.

motion for reduction 0f sentence under Rule

we review the denial of the motion for an abuse 0f discretion. ’”

154 Idaho 281, 288, 297 P.3d 244, 251 (2013) (quoting State

203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)); see also State

385

When

1.)

Of Review

“‘If a sentence is within the statutory limits, a

35

and thus abused

V.

V.

State

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415 P.3d 381,

App. 2015) (“A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35

is

essentially a plea for

leniency, addressed t0 the sound discretion 0f the court”).

Burrington Has

C.

The

“When
light

Shown No Abuse Of The

district court

did not abuse

its

District Court’s Discretion

discretion

when it denied Burrington’s Rule 35

presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must

show

that the sentence is excessive in

of new or additional information subsequently provided t0 the

Rule 35 motion.”

State V. Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729,
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motion.

district court in

support 0f the

316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013)

(internal

quotations omitted).

“In conducting our review 0f the grant or denial 0f a Rule 35 motion,

we

consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of
the original sentence.” Anderson, 163 Idaho at 517,

The

district court

a reduction 0f sentence.

when

exercised sound reason

The court considered

415 P.3d

the

385.

denied Burrington’s Rule 35 motion for

it

new

at

information that Burrington submitted in

support of her motion, the underlying facts 0f the case, and Burrington’s criminal history.
pp.210-12.)

On

one hand, the court noted that Burrington had taken positive steps towards her

rehabilitation. (R., p.212.)

But 0n the

other, the court expressed legitimate

of Burrington’s long history and pattern 0f deceptive behavior.
that serving a

sentence.

(R.,

mere eight months was insufﬁcient

(R., p.212.)

concern about evidence

(R., p.212.)

The court concluded

to justify a reduction t0 the

ﬁxed portion 0f her

In light 0f the circumstances of this case and applying the goals of

sentencing, the court correctly concluded that the “sentence 0f ten years With

appropriate and satisﬁes

all

two years ﬁxed

is

the goals of sentencing.” (R., p.213.)

Burrington incorrectly argues that the “new and additional information showed [her]
sentence

was excessive and supported a sentence

reduction.” (Appellant’s brief, p.1

1.)

In support

of her motion, Burrington stated that she had used her time while imprisoned wisely, stayed out 0f
trouble,

obtained

full

time employment, volunteered for projects in the

participated in classes, secured a bed With Rising Sun, and set

The court

health. (R. p.210.)

distilled her

argument

she could “be in an environment With others
rather than long term inmates

11.)

The new and

motion

may show

Who

t0

be

Who have

are choosing not t0

facility,

actively

up treatment With Ascent Behavioral

that she

was requesting leniency so

that

a similar outlook and desire to succeed,

comply With

facility rules.”

(R.,

pp.210-

additional information that Burrington submitted in support of her Rule 35

that While incarcerated she has taken positive steps towards her rehabilitation.

15

But, the potential reward for

good behavior while

Thus, she has failed t0 show that the

district court

in prison is parole, not leniency in her sentence.

abused

its

discretion

When it denied her Rule 35

motion requesting leniency.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

DATED this 25th day of February, 2020.
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